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ToWER-LusTHAus DoCTRINB-Respondent and his four sons formed a partnership in 1939. The sons contributed cattle and property purchased from respondent who accepted their notes in return. Subsequently, part of the notes were
forgiven and part paid from shares of the firm proceeds. A firm bank account
was opened on which all members could draw. It was planned that all the
sons would render substantial services to the partnership. However, the plan
was disrupted when the two eldest were called to military duty, and the two
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minor sons continued their education. A partnership return was filed for 1940.
The Commissioner determined a deficiency against the respondent, which the
Tax Court1 upheld on authority of the Tower and Lusthaus cases.2 The circuit
court of appeals reversed, 3 holding that the vital services required by the TowerLusthaus doctrine could be contributed presently or at a contemplated future
time. On appeal, held, reversed. The intention to contribute capital or services
sometime in the future is insufficient to establish a partnership for tax purposes.
In addition, the Tax Court having erroneously applied an objective standard
test not justified by the Tower and Lusthaus decisions, the case is remanded
to it for a determination in accordance with this opinion. Commissioner 11.
Culbertson? 335 U.S. 883, 69 S.Ct. 1210 (1949).
In the course of the Tower opinion the Court stated, "If she [wife] either
invests capital originating with her or substantially contributes to the control and
management of the business, or otherwise performs vital additional services, or does
all of these things she may be a partner..••"4 The Tax Court has apparently
seized upon this language as laying down an objective standard which family
partnerships must meet if they are to receive tax recognition.5 This approach,
stemming from a selective culling of the Tower and Lusthaus opinions, has
caused a departure from the fundamental doctrine therein formulated. 6 It
ignores the vital thread interwoven throughout the opinions-that the courts
should merely take the enumerated circumstances into consideration in determining whether the partners really intended a genuine union for partnership
business purposes.7 The principal case again stresses the "... bona £.de intent
W. 0. Culbertson, Sr., 1947 P.H. T.C. Memo. Dec. ,r47,168.
Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 66 S.Ct. 532 (1946); Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293, 66 S.Ct. 539 (1946).
8 Culbertson v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1948) 168 F. (2d) 979, noted in 47 M:xCH.
L. REv. 595 (1949).
4 Commissioner v. Tower, supra, note 2. The income splitting provisions of the 1948
Revenue Act, [P.L. 471, 80th Cong., 2d sess., c. 168, §301 (1948)), has lessened the
importance of the family partnership as a tax avoidance device.
5 Fletcher v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d, 1947) 164 F. (2d) 182 at 183, where the
court in discussing the Tower and Lusthaus opinions stated, "As we understand it, there
are four conditions whose combined existence will make such a partnership 'unreal' when
taxes are in question •.••" Hougland v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th, 1948) 166 F. (2d)
815; Gil Graber, 1948 P.H. Tax Ct. Memo. Dec. ,r48,001; Simons v. Commissioner, 7
T.C. 114 (1946); Tuttle and Wilson, "The Confusion on Family Partnerships," 9 GA.
B.J. 353 (1947); and see Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion to the Tower case at page
292, note 2, supra.
6 Vinson, C. J., stating in the principal case at 1214, "It ignores what we said is the
ultimate question for decision, namely, 'whether the partnership is real within the meaning
of the federal revenue laws' and makes decisive what we described as 'circumstances [to be
taken] into consideration' in making that determination." And see Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion at 1218; Mannheimer and Mook, "A Taxwise Evaluation of Family
Partnerships," 32 IowA L. REv. 436 (1947).
7 See note 2, supra.
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that they be partners in the conduct of the cattle business...."8 The emphasis
is not on the setting down of an itemized objective standard, rather the emphasis must be on the real intent of the partners gained from all the circumstances. This bona fide intent doctrine, re-emphasized in this decision, is a clear
limitation on the application of the Tower and Lusthaus cases. It will no longer
be sufficient for the Tax Court to isolate the sources of capital contributions,9
the amount and kind of services rendered,10 and determine from those alone
whether a partnership exists. Several divergent views represented by the concurring opinions indicate that all questions are by no means closed.11 However,
the instant decision has reduced each case to a question of fact to be determined
on the issue of real intent to form a true business partnership.12

Earl R. Boonstra, S.Ed.

s Principal case at 1217.
OLowry v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th, 1946) 154 F. (2d) 448; Herskovits, 1948

P.H. T.C. Memo. Dec. 1[48,090; Sandberg v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 423 (1947).
10 Robert H. Cole, 1948 P. H. Tax Ct. Memo Dec. 1[48,023; Irving Wenig, 1947
P.H. T.C. Memo. Dec. ,!47,338.
11 Justices Black and Rutledge felt the Tax Court properly applied the Tower and
Lusthaus cases but acquiesced in the court's opinion; Justice Burton believed a commitment to
give future services to be a material consideration in determining partnership reality; Justice
Jackson would pennit the common law partnership concepts to control; and, Justice Frankfurter stated the Tower and Lusthaus cases simply follow the general rules of commercial
partnerships.
.
12 Internal Revenue Code §1141 (a) provides for review of Tax Court decisions by
circuit courts of appeals in the same manner that equity appeals are reviewed. Therefore,
the £ndings of fact are subject to scrutiny on appeal.

